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Effects of Wage and Priée Controls 
in Canada, 1975-1978 
Paul D. Staudohar 
The author examines the récent Canadian expérience in wage 
and price controls» including an analysis of thèse controls, the 
problems confronting their implementation, and certain of their 
results. 
While there is considérable disagreement over how to effectively con-
tain inflation, many observer s feel it has become the most serious problem 
facing advanced Western nations. Since 1960 numerous wage and price con-
trol programs, both voluntary and mandatory, hâve been adopted in 
Europe and North America. Unfortunately, thèse incomes policies hâve not 
been very successful in combating inflation1. This paper2 examines 
Canada's most récent expérience3 with wage and price controls. Its findings 
should be particularly relevant in light of Président Carter's décision to 
adopt voluntary wage-price guidelines, and the possibility of future man-
datory controls in the United States. 
* STAUDOHAR, P.D., Professor of Business Administration, California State Univer-
sity, Hayward, California. 
1 See for example Murray EDELMAN and R. W. FLEMING, The Politics of Wage-
Price Décisions: A Four-Country Analysis, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1965; Lloyd 
ULMAN and Robert J. FLANAGAN, Wage Restraint: A Study of Incomes Policies in 
Western Europe, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971; Jerry E. POHLMAN, Infla-
tion Under Control? Reston, Virginia, Reston Publishing Company, Inc., 1976; Alice ROTH 
and André SHARON, Controls - Who Needs Them? How Europe has Fared Under Incomes 
Policies Since 1974, New York, Drexel Burnham Lambert Incorporated, August 1978; 
Laurence C. HUNTER, "British Incomes Policy, 1972-1974," IndustrialandLabor Relations 
Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, October 1975, pp. 67-84; and Robert J. GORDON, "What Can 
Stabilization Policy Achieve?" American Economie Review, Vol. 68, No. 2, May 1978, pp. 
335-341. 
2 This paper has benefited from the helpful comments of Joseph B. ROSE, Mark 
MUELLER, Gary N. CHAISON, Edward MAHER, and Dennis PROVOST. 
3 Mandatory controls were adopted during World War II and a voluntary program ex-
isted between 1969 and 1972. For a more detailed description of the Canadian expérience, see 
Canadian Perspectives on Wage-Price Guidelines: A Book of Readings, éd. by W. D. Wood 
and Pradeep Kumar, Kingston, Ontario, Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 
1976. 
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THE PRE-CONTROLS PERIOD 
In 1975 priées in Canada rose by 11 percent for the second consécutive 
year4. Among other problems, inflation strained the country's ability to 
compete in world markets and reduced business* capacity to expand opéra-
tions. Accompanying the rapid rise in inflation were pressures on the 
fédéral government to devise a plan to check it. 
While there was hardly unanimity as to the primary cause of inflation, 
the government attributed the rise in consumer priées to cost-push factors. 
In particular, there was mounting concern over trends in compensation as 
unions attempted to either "catch-up" or préserve gains in real earnings 
during a period of accelerating inflation. Negotiated increases in base wage 
rates, which had averaged eight percent annually between 1970 and 1973, 
were being offset by the émergence of double-digit inflation in 1973. As a 
resuit hourly wage rates began increasing at a record pace (12.1 and 13.8 
percent in 1974 and 1975), easily outdistancing price changes5. Larger wage 
settlements were accompanied by a worsening strike record. Man-days idle 
due to work stoppages reached an all-time record in 1975 of 10,908,810, or 
nearly twice the volume of strike activity experienced in 19736. 
Both the rise in compensation levels and a lag in productivity placed an 
enormous strain on unit labor costs in Canada. As Kumar observed: 
In 1975, however, labour costs became the major source of price increase: 
more than nine-tenths of the rise in the GNP price deflator during the 
first half of 1975 was due to unit labour costs7. 
Indeed, the labor cost and productivity picture was significantly worse in 
Canada than in the U.S. By 1975, unit labor costs in Canadian manufactur-
ing were on a par with the U.S., whereas five years earlier they had been 15 
percent lower in Canada8. 
4 Statistics Canada, The Consumer Price Index, Vol. 56, June 1978, p. 5. 
5 In addition, wage settlements were considerably higher for government employées 
than the all-industry average. Labour Canada, Wage Developments 1976, Ottawa, Collective 
Bargaining Division, 1977. 
6 Canada Department of Labour, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1973-1975. 
7 Pradeep Kumar, "The Current Canadian Wage Scène: Major Trends and Patterns", 
in Canadian Perspectives on Wage-Price Guidelines: A Book of Readings, op. cit., pp. 
288-290. During this period, labor's share of national income returned to its 1971-1972 level. In 
the intervening years corporate profits and investment income were the prédominant income 
components of inflation. 
8 Ibid., pp. 290-291. 
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Government expenditures and monetary policy also contributed to the 
inflationary spiral. Total government expenditures increased by nearly 25 
percent in 1974. The money supply was expanding at an annual rate ex-
ceeding 20 percent in both 1974 and 1975. This underscored the need to aug-
ment any program of wage and price controls with fiscal and monetary 
restraint. 
PROGRAM AND GUIDELINES 
In October 1975 the Canadian government opted for mandatory wage 
and price controls along with a strategy of gradualism with respect to 
monetary and fiscal policies. This approach sought to minimize the tradeoff 
between price stability and higher unemployment. Unlike the initial phase 
of Président Nixon's control program, there was no freeze imposed on 
priées and ineomes. Instead, the program was to be phased in as collective 
agreements expired, and guidelines were established in anticipation that 
controls might be required for up to three years. The anti-inflation program 
had four major éléments. 
(1) Fiscal and monetary policies aimed at increasing total demand 
and production at a rate consistent with declining inflation. 
(2) Government expenditure policies aimed at limiting the growth 
of public expenditures and the rate of increase in public service 
employment. 
(3) Structural policies to deal with the spécial problems of energy, 
food and housing, to ensure a more efficient and compétitive 
economy and to improve labour-management relations. 
(4) A priées and ineomes policy which establishes guidelines for 
responsible social behaviour in determining priées and ineomes 
of groups, together with machinery for administering thèse 
guidelines and ensuring compliance where necessary9. 
Compliance with thèse objectives was sought through légal compulsion 
and moral suasion. Subject to légal enforcement were firms with more than 
500 employées. This encompassed the nation's 1,500 largest companies. 
Firms in the construction industry with more than 20 employées were 
covered, as were professional groups such as doctors, lawyers, accountants, 
and engineers. The fédéral government and its agencies were also subject to 
9 Attack on Inflation: A Program of National Action, Policy Statement Tabled in the 
House of Commons by the Honourable Donald S. Macdonald, Minister of Finance, October 
14, 1975, Ottawa, Government of Canada, 1975, p. 3. 
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mandatory régulation, as were provincial and local governments which 
elected to participate. Groups not specifically covered were strongly en-
couraged to comply. 
The price guidelines allowed increases only if costs increased. Alter-
natively, firms were expected to reduce priées if costs fell. The compensa-
tion guidelines established a "basic protection factor" which permitted in-
creases of eight percent in the first year of a unilatéral compensation plan or 
collective agreement, six percent for the second year, and four percent for 
the third year10. An additional two percent per year was allowed for na-
tional productivity increases. Also possible was an "expérience 
adjustment" ranging from minus two percent to plus two percent depen-
ding on the earnings expérience of groups prior to implementation of wage 
controls. Minimum and maximum dollar limits were placed on compensa-
tion. At one extrême, any increase of $600 a year was permissible, whereas 
the upper limit on wages and salaries was set at $2,400. (Employées were 
permitted in program year two to earn up to $3.50 per hour or $7,000 per 
year without being subject to the guidelines.)11 
Some important exceptions to the controls and guidelines should be 
noted. For example, food and energy priées were exempt. In addition, firms 
were not required to establish priées that would perpetuate or create a loss 
in their overall opérations. Wage increases above the guidelines were also 
permitted if: (1) an employer would hâve difficulty attracting or retaining 
employées; (2) an historical relationship existed between employée groups; 
or (3) other spécial circumstances existed. 
Administration of the program was vested in three independently 
operating agencies: (1) the Anti-Inflation Board (AIB), (2) the Office of the 
Administrator (hereafter Administrator), and (3) the Anti-Inflation Appeal 
Tribunal (AIAT). The AIB*s principal function was to monitor and identify 
changes in priées and wages that exceeded the guidelines. It also had the 
10 The "basic protection factor" was designed to protect wages against future price in-
creases. 
11 Beside the controls on wages and priées, increases in profits, dividends and rents were 
also limited. Firms operating in the non-distribution sector were required to limit pre-tax pro-
fits as a percentage of sales to 85 percent of the base period margin. (The base period was either 
the five fiscal years prior to October 14,1975, or the most récent fiscal year ended prior to May 
1, 1976.) Firms in the distribution sector were required to meet a similar margin test of 95 per-
cent. However, ail firms were allowed to earn a maximum rate of return of eight percent on 
their equity, regardless of base period expérience. The initial gênerai guideline on dividends 
was that they could not exceed dividends paid during the previous fiscal year. Finally, respon-
sibility for rent controls was placed in the provincial governments, each of which established 
their own program. 
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task of seeking to persuade parties to modify proposed actions thaï; were not 
in compliance. Most of the day-to-day régulation under the program was 
carried out by the AIB. Its staff size peaked at 917 employées in March 
I97712 j n e Administrator's rôle was to act on spécifie cases referred to him 
alleging violation of the guidelines. If the Administrator found that the 
guidelines were breached, he could order compliance and recover excess 
payments or receipts. He could also impose a penalty of 25 percent of the 
excess compensation. Penalties of up to $10,000 and/or two to five years 
imprisonment were established for individual violations, as well as in-
dividual fines of up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment for one year for failing 
to comply with an order of the Administrator. The Administrator's déci-
sions could be appealed to the AI AT (within a 60-day period), which was 
empowered to accept, modify, or overturn the Administrator's décisions. 
AI AT décisions were appealable to the courts. 
Thus the government tried to establish spécifie standards with some 
flexibility to allow for exceptions in unusual cases. Although a large number 
of changes were made in the guidelines, notably on profits and appeal pro-
cédures, the structural content of the program did not greatly change until 
the process of decontrol began in April 1978. The remainder of this paper 
examines implementation problems, and trends in compensation, priées, 
and fiscal and monetary policies prior to and during the controls period up 
to decontrol. 
IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS 
In their thoughful pièce on the récent United States expérience with 
wage and price controls, Schultz and Dam identify an important thème: 
that the advocacy process has a great impact on the administration of con-
trols13. Expectations, and notions of equity that spring from interest 
groups, often do not comport with program goals. As the authors put it: 
Issues that were formerly submerged in a specialized bureaucracy 
dedicated to a spécial interest are thrown into a more gênerai governmen-
tal policy-making framework and into public discussion. New considéra-
tions are brought to bear, and old ones are reweighted. Often the political 
repercussions of such a reweighting are severe and may even 
bring down the whole program. In any event, the advocacy élément in the 
making of public policy is thrown into sharp relief during the administra-
tion of wage and price controls14. 
12 Anti-Inflation Board, Second Year Report, Ottawa, Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada, 1977, p. 18. 
13 SCHULTZ, George P., and Kenneth W. DAM, "Reflections on Wage and Price 
Controls", IndustrialandLabor RelationsReview, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1977, pp. 139-151. 
14 Ibid., p. 140. 
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The "advocacy élément'* at work during the Canadian controls does 
not appear to hâve had as significant an impact as it did in the U.S. from 
1971-74. In the U.S. the chorus of advocacy for removal of controls 
-especially as they revealed dislocations in the economy and poor perfor-
mance in checking priées during Phases III and IV - was largely responsible 
for the démise of the program. In Canada the controls for the most part 
foliowed their initial prescription and time path. However, administration 
of the Canadian program was subject to sharp criticism and efforts by in-
terest groups to hasten its removal15. 
For example, shortly after the program began, 17 of the country's 
leading economists sent a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau criticizing the 
controls and urging their removal16. Thèse economists believed that the con-
trols would not work and that the government should instead concentrate 
on cutting its déficit and reducing corporate, union, and government 
bureaucracy power. As they put it, déficits in government spending (at the 
fédéral, provincial, and municipal levels) "where probably the most potent 
internai source of our rate of inflation"17. 
Also under fire from various quarters, including the press, was a lack 
of clarity in program administration. This initially centered on the question 
of appeal of administrative décisions. Under the provisions of the White 
Paper it appeared that either party or both could appeal AIB décisions to 
the Administrator, and subsequently to the AI AT, and the courts. In prac-
tice, however, it became necessary for the AIB to ask the Administrator for 
an order to enforce its findings or for the AIB to agrée to submit its findings 
to the Administrator. In effect, access to the Administrator required the 
consent of the AIB, and it was necessary for a party to contravene an AIB 
décision in order to qualify for appeal. The conditional nature of appeals 
caused confusion and vexed those parties adversely affected by AIB déci-
sions. 
This was amply illustrated in the AIB*s first décision. Irving Pulp and 
Paper Ltd. paid its employées more than the 14 percent increase allô wed by 
the AIB so that it could qualify for appeal of the AIB*s décision. Irving had 
negotiated the pay increase with the Canadian Paperworkers Union. This 
prompted the AIB to bring the matter before the Administrator. He ratified 
15 The program did, however, survive a constitutional challenge. John KING, "Suprême 
Court Rules 7-2 AIB Act Constitutional", Globe and Mail, Toronto, July 13, 1976, p. 11. 
16 CHEVELDAYOFF, Wayne, "17 Economists Say Controls Won't Work, Tell Ottawa 
To Cut Its Déficit", Globe and Mail, Toronto, December 3, 1975, pp. 1-2 
17 Ibid. 
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the AIB's 14 percent limit, and required the company to pay $100,000 for 
recovery of excess wages, plus $25,000 in fines for contravening the AIB 
ruling18. This time consuming and costly appeal process was remedied by 
législative amendment in April 1976. Under the revised procédure either 
party was allowed to request the AIB to refer a décision to the Ad-
ministrator for review, with the AIB required to do so. 
The Irving case did, nevertheless, indicate the government's tough 
stance on enforcement. It also encouraged employers to adopt a stronger 
position in wage bargaining. If a firm could avoid a strike by settling at a 
higher wage than provided in the guidelines and then wait for an AIB 
rollback, it could afford to be less rigid in collective bargaining. But, facing 
penalties for failure to adhère to guidelines, firms would hâve an incentive 
to hold the line in negotiations. Even if a firm was forced by hard union 
bargaining to exceed the guidelines it could not legally put them into effect 
and could be fined if it did so. 
Another attempt to shape public opinion, and thereby undermine con-
trols, was undertaken by the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). In May 
1976, a document titled "Labour's Manifesto for Canada" was adopted by 
80 percent of the delegates at the CLC's biennial convention. The conven-
tion also gave the fédération's executive council a mandate to call a gênerai 
strike, if necessary, to fight the wage-price controls. Among the grievances 
cited in the manifesto were the government's rollback of collective bargain-
ing agreements, destruction of the negotiation process, and inéquitable ap-
plication of guidelines19. This philosophical commitment became a reality 
on October 14, 1976, when 830,000 employées participated in the CLC's 
"national day of protest" against the anti-inflation program. 
Strike activity was a problem during the controls. After numbering bet-
ween about 550 to 700 per year in the early 1970's, strike frequency jumped 
to 1,218 in 1974, 1,171 in 1975, and 1,039 in 197620. During thèse years the 
incidence of strikes, particularly high in French Canada, was more than in 
nearly ail other industrialized countries. Clearly thèse strikes, whether 
motivated by wage controls or not, cast a sour note on the government's ef-
forts. 
18 Globe and Mail, Toronto, February 14, 1976, p. Bl, and February 27, 1976, p. B2. 
19 BANNON, Sharleen, "Canadian Labour Congress Convention 1976", The Labour 
Gazette, Vol. 76, June 1976, p. 306. 
20 Data from The Labour Gazette, February , March , and May, 1978. 
EFFECTS OF WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS IN CANADA, 1975-1978 681 
COMPENSATION 
Various data sources indicate that compensation increases declined 
steadily throughout the controls period (see Tables 1 and 2). Looking first 
at wages, increases in hourly earnings in manufacturing declined from 13.8 
percent in 1975 to 13 percent in program year one. In program years two 
and three wage increases dipped to 10.6 percent and 6.1 percent, respective-
ly. The same trend is reflected in base wage rates contained in major collec-
tive agreements covering 500 or more employées (excluding the construction 
industry). 
Table 1 
Annual Rates of Changes in Wages and Consumer Priées 
Wages CPI 
Period Hourly Base Wage AU Food 
Earnings Rates (All- Items 
(Mfg.) Industry 
Average 
1970-71 9.0 7.8 2.9 1.0 
1971-72 7.9 7.2 4.8 7.6 
1972-73 8.8 8.1 7.6 14.6 
1973-74 13.5 12.1 10.9 16.3 
1974-75 15.8 13.8 10.8 12.9 
1975-76 13.8 13.6 7.5 2.7 
Program Year 1 
(10-75-10-76) 13.0 15.0a 6.2 -1.2 
Program Year 2 
(10-76-10-77) 10.6 7.8 8.8 12.7 
Program Year 3 
(10-77-4-78) 6.1 6.5 7.5 14.4 
aBased on major collective bargaining settlements 
Sources: Statistics Canada, Canadian Statistical Review, May 1978; Employment, Earnings 
and Hours, April 1978; The Consumer Price Index, July 1978; and The Labour 
Gazette, May 1978. 
A further indication of the dimensions of this trend can be ascertained 
by examining AIB compensation décisions (Table 2). From the outset of the 
program to the decontroi stage, compensation (wages plus fringe benefits) 
declined steadily, with the rates for public employées falling at a faster rate 
than private industry employées. 
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Table 2 
Compensation Increases Submitted to the AIB and 
Average Percentage Guidelines by Program Year 
Cases Emps. Probb Guidec Cases Emps. Prop Guide 
Under11 Under 
(000) 
Under Under Overd Over 
(000) 
Over Over 
Pre Program 
(Before 10-75) 
Private Sector 519 82,930 8.32 9.58 641 130,815 14.66 9.93 
Public Sectore 226 27,880 8.87 10.68 302 70,818 20.69 11.88 
Program Year 1 
(10-75-10-76) 
Private Sector 13,571 1,227,280 8.63 9.92 7,081 1,095,731 11.46 9.12 
Public Sector 5,471 623,826 8.91 9.66 4,243 389,600 12.02 8.98 
Program Year 2 
(10-76-10-77) 
Private Sector 13,834 1,657,897 7.12 7.85 6,071 786,227 8.93 7.06 
Public Sector 5,809 796,234 7.06 7.64 3,255 295,824 8.23 6.95 
Program Year 3 
(10-77-4-78) 
Private Sector 4,979 651,445 5.64 6.03 2,035 335,001 6.66 5.36 
Public Sector 1,433 208,351 5.15 5.44 729 30,752 6.16 5.33 
aUnder: Compensation groups submitting increases equal to or below the arithmetic 
guidelines 
"Prop: Average rate of compensation increase submitted 
cGuide: Average maximum rate of compensation increase allowed by guidelines 
"Over: Compensation groups submitting increases above the arithmetic guidelines 
ePublic sector includes fédéral and provincial data 
Source: Data sent to the author, by Mark Mueller, Director, Economie Analysis Branch of the 
AIB. Data compiled by the AIB as of June 14, 1978. 
Other AIB data show that the total (private and public) compensation 
increases submitted to the AIB during the first year of the program were 
10.2 percent, a sizeable drop from the pre-program level of 14.1 percent, 
and that by the third program year average increases were down to 6.1 
percent21. In each year the average compensation increases submitted to the 
AIB were less than the average arithmetic guidelines22. 
In a study by Auld, et al., which examined the effects that controls had 
on negotiated wage contracts, it was found that for the first two years of the 
21 Anti-Inflation Board, Anti-Inflation Program: Progress Report of the Anti-Inflation 
Board, Ottawa, AIB, March 1977, p. 4. 
22 Ibid. 
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controls wage settlements were two and-one-half percent lower per year 
than they would hâve been in the absence of controls23. However, it was 
cautioned that controls may hâve had a perverse impact on wages for two 
reasons. First, potentially lower settlements may hâve been pulled up to the 
guideline level if that level was too high. And secondly, employers and 
unions may hâve settled at higher wages than they otherwise would hâve, in 
anticipation of an AIB rollback24. 
Increases in productivity of workers, which stimulate real économie 
growth, serve to reduce the rate of price rises by keeping unit labor costs 
lower than they would otherwise be. According to estimâtes by the U.S. 
Department of Labor, output per hour in Canadian manufacturing rose by 
3.3 percent in 1976 and 4.0 percent in 1977. Unit labor costs rose during 
thèse years by 9.1 and 5.9 percent respectively25. 
PRICES 
The number of firms required to pre-notify the AIB of significant price 
increases grew from 117 in January 1976 to 342 in June 1977. In 1976 the 
average pre-notified price increase was 8.6 percent; during the first eight 
months of 1977 the average requested dropped to 4.1 percent26. Despite the 
increase in the number of firms required to pre-notify on priées, only a par-
tial view of price trends émerges from thèse data. Therefore it should be fur-
ther instructive to examine changes in the consumer price index. 
Price trends in Canada are shown in Table 1 in the preceding section. 
CPI data shows that during the first year of the program priées rose by 6.2 
23 A U L D , D. , L. CHRISTOFIDES, R. SWIDINSKY, and D. W I L T O N , " T h e Impact 
of the Anti-Inflation Board on Negotiated Wage Sett lements", paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the Canadian Economies Association, May 29-30, 1978, p . 41 . (Mimeographed) 
24 Ibid., p . 2. Another study noted that while controls reduced wage settlements by 
about three percent, they did not appear to hâve a significant effect on real wage increases. Its 
author concluded: "Thèse results suggest that controls hâve had an indirect effect on inflation 
through restraining rises in unit costs, even though it is unlikely that controls hâve had much 
direct impact on price inflation. (Emphasis in the original) Frank REID, " T h e Effect of Con-
trols on the Rate of Change of Real and Money Wages in C a n a d a " , a paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the Canadian Economies Association, May 28-30, 1978, p . 17. 
(Mimeographed) 
25 U.S . Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Internat ional Comparisons 
of Productivity and Labor Cost Trends in Manufac tur ing" , USDL 78-443, news release of 
May 1978, p . 1. 
26 Anti-Inflation Board, Second Year Report, op. cit., p . 12. The prenotification re-
quirement began in 1976. 
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percent; in the second year by 8.8 percent; and in the last six months by 
about 7.5 percent on an annual basis. Since in the year preceding controls 
priées had risen by nearly 11 percent, the réduction of inflation during the 
first year of the program is significant. However, some of the réduction was 
due to uncontrolled food and import priées rising than the overall index. 
The AIB estimated that CPI components which were subject to controls in-
creased by about eight percent during the first year. This matched the AIB's 
goal for the first year27. 
For the second year of the program the AIB's target for increase in the 
CPI was six percent28. Since the index rose by 8.8 percent this objective was 
not met. The modération in inflation to about a 7.5 percent annual rate for 
the remaining six months of the program, however, is a positive resuit. It 
should also be noted that energy priées, which were not controlled, climbed 
at a rate approximately twice that of the overall price index from the outset 
of controls through 1977,29 making the AIB's objectives more difficult to 
achieve. 
MONETARY POLICY 
Because it was felt in 1975 that a too drastic curtailment of the rate of 
monetary expansion would almost certainly plunge the Canadian economy 
into sharp recession, the alternative chosen was to slow the rate of monetary 
growth in a séries of graduai steps30. Primary responsibility for implemen-
ting monetary policy is vested in the Bank of Canada. The main indicator 
used to measure the money supply is currency and demand deposits. 
Known as Ml, it is not as comprehensive a measure of public transaction 
balances as the Ml used in the United States. This is because in Canada 
checks may be drawn on certain interest-bearing savings accounts, whereas 
in the U.S. virtually ail checkable deposits are demand deposits. 
From January 1973 to January 1975 Ml rose by about 20 percent. This 
rapid increase led to the inflationary spiral that was the progenitor of con-
trols. Data on Ml from the initiation of controls to the time that decontrol 
27 Anti-Inflat ion Board, First Year Report, O t tawa , Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada , 1976, p . 2. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Anti-Inflat ion Board, Second Year Report, op. cit., p . 6. 
30 Remarks by G. E . F R E E M A N , Deputy Governor , Bank of Canada , at the Economie 
Out look Conférence of the Canad ian Association for Business Economies , Ot tawa, May 11, 
1978, p . 4. (Mimeographed) 
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began is shown in Table 3. During this period Ml increased by a total of ap-
proximately 19 percent. For the first program year it increased by about 5.4 
percent. This showed considérable monetary restraint by the Bank of 
Canada. In the second year (beginning in October 1976) the rate of increase 
climbed to 9.5 percent. However, it is moderated some during the five 
months before decontrol. 
Table 3 
Currency and Demand Deposits (Ml) for Canada 
October 1975 to March 1978 
(millions of dollars) 
Month Ml Month Ml 
and Year and Year 
Oct. 1975 17,395 Jan. 1977 18,639 
Nov. 18,342 Feb. 18,791 
Dec. 18,298 March 19,046 
Jan. 1976 17,733 April 18,930 
Feb. 17,818 May 19,269 
March 17,737 June 19,730 
April 17,632 July 19,607 
May 17,885 August 19,824 
June 18,138 Sept. 20,024 
July 18,096 Oct. 20,069 
August 18,204 Nov. 20,473 
Sept. 18,402 Dec. 20,841 
Oct. 18,335 Jan. 1978 20,646 
Nov. 18,416 Feb. 20,873 
Dec. 18,638 March 20,732 
Source: Bank of Canada Review, date published May 4,1978 by the Bank of Canada, Ottawa, 
p. 24. 
The réduction in the rate of growth in the money supply in the first year 
of controls was a key factor, along with productivity gains, in causing wages 
and priées to moderate in 1976. That the rate of inflation began to climb 
again in 1977 is due to the Bank of Canada's reluctance to continue to apply 
the monetary brakes, a sharp upturn in food priées, and a substantial 
dévaluation of the Canadian dollar which made imports more expensive. 
FISCAL POLICY 
Beginning in the mid-1960's the Canadian fédéral government in-
troduced several new social programs and expanded existing ones. Up to the 
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time of controls government expenditures had risen much more rapidly than 
the economy as a whole. Growth in fédéral spending was concentrated on 
transfer payments, such as pensions, family allowances, and unemployment 
benefits31. A large portion of this spending was statutorily prescribed and 
therefore relatively inflexible downward. Many benefits automatically in-
creased with the cost of living. 
One of the principal objectives of the anti-inflation prograrn was to 
limit the growth of public expenditures. Although tax revenues from in-
dividuals and corporations alternately rose and fell during the controls 
period, the government's policy emphasis was directed at expenditures. 
Starting in 1975 a réduction in the growth rate of spending at the fédéral, 
provincial, and local levels occurred. Total government spending had in-
creased by 24.2 percent in 1974. This rate eased to 22.3 percent in 1975,12.4 
percent in 1976, and 9.9 percent in 1977. (See Table 4) This décélération is 
commendable, and helped to slow inflation. 
Table 4 
Government Expenditures National Accounts Basis, 1974-1977 
(percentage changes) 
1974 1975 1976 1977° 
Fédéral government 
Provincial governments 
Local governments'3 
Total governments0 
aFirst half 1977 over first half 1976. 
"Including hospitals. 
cIncluding Canada and Québec Pension Plan expenditures as well as net fédéral, provincial 
and local expenditures. 
28.7 22.9 9.4 13.7 
22.9 23.8 12.9 12.1 
18.1 19.0 14.8 7.4 
24.2 22.3 12.4 9.9 
Source: Anti-Inflation Board, Second Year Report (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada, 1977), p. 3. 
Accompanying the spending levels, sizeable budget déficits occurred 
during controls, since tax rates were not adjusted as a sufficient offset. Cash 
requirements for the déficits were mostly met through the sale of govern-
ment securities to the public. Therefore the pressure on the banking System 
that might otherwise hâve occurred was minimized, and the Bank of 
Canada was relatively free to pursue monetary policy without concern over 
financing the déficit. 
3i Attack on Inflation: A Prograrn of National Action, op. cit., p. 5. 
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Government expenditures as a percent of Gross National Product rose 
substantially during 1975 to 41.3 percent, from 37.9 percent in the previous 
year. (See Table 5) The percentage dropped in 1976, and up to the time of 
decontrol in 1978 remained approximately at the 1975 proportions. Thèse 
data indicate that while government spending was at high absolute levels, it 
kept pace with overall GNP. Given the difficulty of paring social programs, 
and built-in escalators requiring increases in pensions and other benefits, 
the relatively high level of government spending may not hâve been that ex-
cessive under the circumstances. As it was the unemployment rate rose by 
about three percentage points during 1977, and might well hâve risen more 
had the government slowed spending more drastically. 
Table 5 
Government Expenditures as a Percent of the 
Gross National Product 
(exclusive of intergovernmental transfers) 
First Quarter 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978° 
Total fédéral government 15.4 / 16.8 15.8 16.1 16.7 
--excluding transfers to persons 9.5 10.4 9.8 9.9 10.4 
Total provincial governments 11.1 12.2 12.1 12.4 12.6 
--excluding transfers to persons 8.0 8.9 8.6 8.7 8.9 
Total local governments 8.3 8.8 8.7 8.9 8.6 
Hospitals 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 
Pension plans 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Total ail governments 37.9 41.3 40.3 41.1 41.7 
aBased on data seasonally adjusted at annual rates 
Source: Date provided the author by Statistics Canada. 
Cause for some concern is found in the fédéral budget proposed in 
April 1978. This indicates a projected déficit for 1977-78 of $8.8 billion, up 
from a déficit of $3.86 billion in 1976-7732. For 1978-79 a déficit of $9.25 
billion is forecast in the budget33. The rapid increases in spending scheduled 
would place considérable strain on the government's ability to check infla-
tion during the period of decontrol and thereafter. 
32 Department of Finance, Canada, The Budget, presented by the Honourable Jean 
CHRÉTIEN, Minister of Finance, in the House of Commons, April 10, 1978, Ottawa, Depart-
ment of Finance, 1978, p. 21. 
33 Ibid. 
688 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 34. NO 4 (1979) 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Some économie theorists posit that institutions possessing market 
power will voluntarily restrain their actions in accordance with the public 
interest - and their own long-run interests as well. However, the persistence 
of économie instability in most Western nations makes this proposition 
doubtful. Thus incomes policies, featuring wage and price controls, are 
viewed by others as a contributor to price stability, full employment, and a 
favorable relative position in international markets. Again, however, ex-
périence often shows that wage and price controls, particularly when not ac-
companied by adéquate monetary and fiscal restraint, promise more than 
they can deliver. Why do controls remain popular in light of this ex-
périence? The principal appeal is political - they indicate that the govern-
ment is trying to do something about the problem. 
The Canadian government invoked controls as a resuit of excessive 
cost-push and demand forces. It cannot be overemphasized that whatever 
chance thèse wage and price controls had to achieve success was primarily 
dépendent on the extent to which the rates of monetary growth and budget 
déficits were reduced. Controls can reduce expectations for the short term, 
but unless the underlying demand pressures are adequately contained, ex-
pectations will adjust to économie realities. While inflation can be restrain-
ed, and even lowered by controls, without concomitant policies that impact 
on priées the controls will corne to lack support. The political imperatives 
initially justifying them are then likely to reverse toward favoring their 
dissolution. Therefore it is significant that demand management was includ-
ed in the Canadian program along with the enforcement of wage and price 
guidelines for large segments of the economy. 
Canada's program had a substantial impact on compensation levels, 
which were lowered from annual increases of approximately 14 percent to 
six percent. As a resuit cost-push forces were reduced. Also contributing to 
this décline, however, was the rise in unemployment to about 8.6 percent by 
April 1978. 
While priées were moderated from the pre-control annual rate of in-
crease of about 11 percent to about six percent in the first program year, 
they rose in the second year to nearly nine percent. After falling back for a 
short period the rate of increase in inflation was back up to a 9.2 percent an-
nual rate in mid-1978. As a resuit the program had a greater impact on com-
pensation than priées. Although uncontrolled energy priées rose at about 
twice the rate of overall priées during most of the program, Canada is close 
to a balance between exports and imports of oil and gas. Therefore, little if 
any corrélation is found between inflation and energy imports. 
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During the first year of controls increases in the rate of money supply 
were significantly moderated to 5.4 percent. Unfortunately, it rose to a 9.5 
percent rate of increase in the second year. It is becoming widely accepted 
that increases in a country's money supply hâve a high corrélation with 
future price increases. A lag factor of about six months to a year exists from 
the time that money supply changes are reflected in the price level. That the 
rate of price increases dropped during the first program year and the first 
few months of the second year, while climbing rapidly during the remainder 
of the second year, reinforces the theoretical link between monetary growth 
and price increases. 
Steady réductions in the rate of government spending, from approx-
imately 24 percent in 1974 to about 10 percent in 1977, had a retarding ef-
fect on inflation. However, the rate of increase remained relatively high, 
and substantial budget déficits are forecast for the 1978-79 fiscal year which 
could fuel further inflation. The rising unemployment rate complicated 
government efforts to reduce spending. 
A wage and price control program cannot be fully assessed until long 
after its completion. As evidenced by expérience in the United States and 
Western Europe, it has not been uncommon for wage-price explosions to 
occur after controls are withdrawn. The post-control period in Canada will 
therefore deserve careful attention for years to corne. 
Les conséquences du contrôle des prix 
et des salaires au Canada, 1975-1978 
Depuis 1960, les problèmes reliés à l'inflation ont donné lieu à de nombreux 
programmes de contrôle des salaires et des prix en Europe et en Amérique du Nord. 
Dans la plupart des cas, ces programmes n'ont pas obtenu de grands succès. Qu'en 
est-il de la récente expérience canadienne en matière de contrôle des salaires et des 
prix? 
L'effort canadien mérite une observation attentive de la part des hommes poli-
tiques des pays occidentaux qui projettent l'établissement de tels contrôles. 
En 1975, les prix avaient augmenté de onze pour cent pour la deuxième année 
consécutive. Les taux horaires des salaires montaient à une vitesse sans précédent 
(12.1 pour cent en 1974 et 13.8 pour cent en 1975). Le nombre des grèves était élevé et 
la productivité était faible. Les dépenses gouvernementales et la politique monétaire 
contribuaient aussi à la spirale inflationniste. On pressait le gouvernement de trouver 
des moyens pour lutter contre l'inflation. 
En octobre 1975, le gouvernement adopta des mesures de contrôle des salaires, 
des prix et d'autres sources de revenus. Il chercha aussi à freiner l'expansion fiscale et 
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monétaire. En grande partie, la responsabilité d'administrer les contrôles fut confiée 
à la Commission de lutte à l'inflation. 
Bien que le programme s'en soit tenu à sa conception initiale et que les délais 
prévus furent respectés, il fut sujet à des critiques acerbes de la part de groupes d'in-
térêts. Ainsi dix-sept économistes parmi les plus réputés du pays écrivirent au pre-
mier ministre Trudeau une lettre qui mettait en doute la valeur des contrôles et récla-
maient leur abolition. La presse s'attaqua au manque de clarté dans l'administration 
du programme. Le nombre des grèves dans l'ensemble continua de se maintenir à un 
niveau élevé. Le Congrès du travail au Canada organisa «une journée nationale de 
protestation» en octobre 1976. 
Le programme eut un impact notable sur le taux des augmentations des salaires 
lequel baissa de quatorze à six pour cent annuellement. Les prix tombèrent à un taux 
annuel d'environ six pour cent d'augmentation pendant la première année du pro-
gramme, mais ils étaient remontés à un taux d'environ neuf pour cent à la levée des 
contrôles en 1978. Résultat: les effets du programme furent beaucoup plus marqués 
sur les salaires que sur les prix. 
Le taux de chômage à la hausse compliquait l'effort d'implantation de politi-
ques monétaires et fiscales restrictives. Bien que, dans l'ensemble, les taux 
d'augmentation de la masse monétaire et des dépenses gouvernementales aient été 
freinés, ils restèrent à des niveaux relativement élevés. On en conclut que, quoiqu'il 
en soit du succès des contrôles réalisés au Canada, celui-ci est attribuable à cette 
modération monétaire et fiscale qui se produisit. 
Bien que, sur une courte période, les contrôles puissent tempérer les ambitions, 
à moins que les pressions économiques sous-jacentes ne soient contenues, elles en 
viendront à manquer de soutien. Aussi les éclatements dans les salaires et les prix 
peuvent-ils survenir au moment de l'abolition des contrôles. Par conséquent, le pro-
gramme du Canada continuera à mériter une attention soutenue dans les années à 
venir. 
